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A DEFINITE CLAIM ON CLAIM INDEFINITENESS: 

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DEFINITENESS CASES OF THE PAST 

DECADE WITH A FOCUS ON THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE 

INSOLUBLY AMBIGUOUS STANDARD 

Christa]. Laser* 
Abstract 
This empirical study of patent claim definiteness cases of the past decade makes several 
novel findings including: (1) slightly more than half of final Federal Circuit definiteness cases 
hold the asserted claims not indefinite; (2) the percentage of non-Federal Circuit definiteness 
cases holding claims not indefinite increased approximately 60 percentage points over the ten­
year period focused on in this analysis;(3) the Federal Circuit more often held chemical claims 
not indefinite, but electrical claims indefinite; and (4) the Federal Circuit more often held claims 
with term clarity issues not indefinite, but claims with means-plus-function issues indefinite. 
These differences partially result from the Federal Circuit incorporating an evidentiary burden 
into the "insolubly ambiguous" standard and inconsistently applying the "insolubly ambiguous" 
standard. After describing other effects of this standard, this Article recommends that the Federal 
Circuit modify, clarify, or abolish the "insolubly ambiguous" standard. 
* Article won second place in the Marcus B. Finnegan Writing Competition. 
*Christa Laser is a third-year law student at the George Washington University Law School. She is a notes editor of 
the American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal and studied abroad at the Max Plank Institute 
for Intellectual Property, Competition, and Tax Law. 
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Introduction 
A patent claim must "particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter 
which the applicant regards as his invention."1 This definiteness requirement has two purposes: 
primarily, "to provide clear warning to others as to what constitutes infringement of the patent," 
and, secondarily, "to provide a clear measure of the invention in order to facilitate determinations 
of patentability."2 This empirical study shows that recent Federal Circuit cases have limited the 
doctrine of claim indefiniteness, contrary to public policy and to the intent of§ 112, ,-r 2. 
Section I of this Article provides an introductory background of claim indefiniteness. 
Section II of this Article reports the results of an empirical study of claim indefiniteness over a 
one decade period. Part A of Section II analyzes whether the Federal Circuit and other courts 
more often held claims not indefinite or indefinite. Part B further analyzes indefiniteness 
decisions in the Federal Circuit by subject-area: biochemical, chemical, electrical, or general and 
mechanical. Part C analyzes indefiniteness decisions in the Federal Circuit by reason for the 
court's indefiniteness determination. 
Section III argues that the different percentages of claims found indefinite between these 
categories are due to the Federal Circuit's disparate treatment of means-plus-function issues and 
term clarity issues. This Section shows that when courts find a term clarity issue, they apply the 
"insolubly ambiguous" standard, which incorrectly incorporates the evidentiary burden of clear 
and convincing evidence. This incorporation, while it may achieve the desired result in court, 
ties the hands of the Patent and Trademark Office, requiring the Patent and Trademark Office to 
apply the incorrect burden of proof in some instances. Furthermore, this Section argues that 
evidentiary burdens should not be used to modify purely legal standards. 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit should abolish the "insolubly ambiguous" standard or 
modify it to ensure that it does not incorporate the burden of clear and convincing evidence. 
Courts should instead adopt a simpler indefiniteness standard: if a party seeking to demonstrate 
invalidity can show by clear and convincing evidence that the claim does not meet § 112 (by 
"particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards 
as his invention") then courts should invalidate the patent for indefiniteness.3 If the Federal 
Circuit does not correct this trend soon, a competitor's ability to accurately determine the metes 
and bounds of current patents might deteriorate further, leading to possible unintended 
infringement. 
I. Background: Policy on Claim Indefiniteness 
Public policy supports a strict standard for claim indefiniteness. Precision is "essential to 
warn the industry concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted."4 For this reason, 
unclear metes and bounds of patent claims undermine the very purpose of the patent system, a 
I 35 U.S.C. § 112 ir 2 (2006). 

2 3 DONALDS. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.03 (2009). 

3 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 if 2. 

4 Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refming Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944). 
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system based upon an exchange of information for monopoly rights. 5 The Patent and Trademark 
Office likewise sees the primary purpose of the definiteness requirement as to inform the public 
of these metes and bounds.6 Indeed, indefinite claims can be harmful by: (1) giving the patentee 
an unreasonably large scope to the detriment of the public; (2) creating risk of uncertainty to 
other inventors, who then decrease experimentation and invention; and (3) increasing litigation 
after competitors incorrectly judge the scope of an indefinite patent. 7 
Definite claims serve an additional, "secondary" purpose: to clearly identify the invention 
to enable easier application of other standards of patentability such as nonobviousness and 
novelty.8 Such clarity helps both examiners during the aprlication stage9 and courts that must 
make validity determinations during subsequent litigation. 1 Ideally, if patent examiners demand 
definiteness in claims upfront, that demand reduces litigation later. 11 
However, courts have not extensively incorporated the public policy demand for the 
clearest possible patents into the requirement of claim indefiniteness. 12 Most recently, the 
Federal Circuit set forth the "insolubly ambiguous" standard of claim indefiniteness in Exxon 
Research and Engineering Co. v. United States.13 The court in Exxon opined, "We have not 
insisted that claims be plain on their face in order to avoid condemnation for indefiniteness; 
rather, what we have asked is that the claims be amenable to construction, however difficult that 
task may be."14 The court admitted it is difficult to find a claim indefinite using such a standard, 
but stated that the standard was mandated by the statutory presumption of patent validity under § 
282. 15 
Yet on other issues of validity, such as obviousness, courts do not alter the doctrine in 
response to the statutory presumption of validity. 16 Instead, they simply require that a party 
seeking to demonstrate invalidity do so by clear and convincing evidence. 17 The current Federal 
5 See id. 

6 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANuAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173 (8th ed. 2008) 

[hereinafter M.P.E.P.]. 

7 See Athletic Alts., Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

8 3 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 8.03. 

9 Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. International Trade Comm'n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

10 United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942). 

11 Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed Cir. 2008) ("We note that the patent 

drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, and it is highly desirable that patent 

examiners demand that applicants do so in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during 

prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation."). 

12 See, e.g., Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (where a 

patent on a wheelchair of a size capable of fitting in the back seat of a vehicle was held valid because the claim was 

"as precise as the subject matter permits"); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 

(citing Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (stating that 

the Federal Circuit "does not impose a lofty standard in its indefiniteness cases"). 

13 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

14 Id. 
15 Id. ("By finding claims indefinite only ifreasonable efforts at claim construction prove futile, we accord respect to 

the statutory presumption of patent validity."); 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 

16 See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 993-94 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing AK Steel 

Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 

11 Id. 
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Circuit doctrine on indefiniteness requires a far more rigorous test than that of nonobviousness: a 
party seeking to demonstrate invalidity must demonstrate that the claims are "insolubly 
ambiguous, and no narrowing construction can properly be adopted."18 
Because the policy arguments seem to differ from the current standard set forth by the 
Federal Circuit, one might hope that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari in a claim 
indefiniteness case. However, in the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has only once 
tangentially addressed claim indefiniteness, in the case of Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd. 19 The Court noted that claim indefiniteness policy requires a balance 
between clarity and flexibility. 20 In support of clarity, the Court noted: 
The [patent] monopoly is a property right; and like any property right, its 
boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, because 
it enables efficient investment in innovation. A patent holder should know what 
he owns, and the public should know what he does not. For this reason, the 
patent laws require inventors to describe their work in "full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms," 35 U.S.C. § 112, as part of the delicate balance the law attempts to 
maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to bring the 
invention forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue 
innovations, creations, and new ideas beyond the inventor's exclusive rights.21 
However, the Court also noted that patent claims are necessarily imprecise because an invention 
is a "tangible" thing, with its verbal description merely an "afterthought written to satisfy the 
requirements of patent law."22 As the Festa Court explained, "[t]hings are not made for the sake 
ofwords, but words for things.'m 
The courts must weigh these competing interests. On one hand, if competitors are 
uncertain about a patent's breadth, they may be deterred from engaging in legitimate activities 
outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake in competing products that are within the 
patent's scope. In addition, competitors may engage in wasteful litigation that a stricter rule 
might prevent. 24 On the other hand, the Court acknowledged that this lack of clarity is a 
necessary evil of ensuring incentives for innovation, and literalism leaves the patent unsecured 
from copiers who seek to exploit the limits oflanguage.25 
18 Exxon, 265 F.3d at 1375. 

19 535 U.S. 722 (2002). See 3 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 8.03. Before Festa, the last case on claim indefiniteness was 

United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 55 USPQ 381 (1942)). This case was about the doctrine 

of equivalents, and thus the U.S.P.Q. did not index it under 115.1109, but the same policy espoused by the Court 

applies to claim indefmiteness. 

2°Festa, 535 U.S. at 722. 

21 Id at 730-31. 

22 Id at 731. 

23 Id (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. CL 1967)). 

24 Id at 732. 

25 Id at 732 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 15 How. 330, 343, 14 L. Ed. 717 (1854) ("The exclusive right 

to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or 

proportions.")). 
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II. Results 
A. 	 Slightly More Than HalfofFinal Federal Circuit Decisions on Claim 
Indefiniteness Hold the Claim Not Indefinite26 
During the period from December, 1998 to December, 2008,27 the Federal Circuit heard 
forty-eight28 cases that contained a claim indefiniteness issue.29. Over the same ~eriod of time, 
the Federal Circuit heard a total of 1,171 cases on intellectual property issues. 0 Thus, claim 
indefiniteness issues appeared in 3.84% of Federal Circuit intellectual property cases.31 
In those forty-eight cases, the Federal Circuit found claims definite in thirty-two cases but 
indefinite in sixteen cases. In other words, 66.67% of all Federal Circuit claim indefiniteness 
cases found claims definite and 33.33% of cases found claims indefinite. 
Table 1 shows how many and what percentages of Federal Circuit indefiniteness cases 
were held definite and indefinite each year. Figure 1 shows how the percentage of Federal 
Circuit indefiniteness cases that held claims definite decreased slightly from 1998 to 2008.32 
26 "Definite" will be used in text, graphs, and tables to mean "not indefmite." This alteration is designed to make the 
data easier to understand for readers not familiar with patent law's technically correct double negatives and to make 
tables fit more easily onto the page. 
27 The time period was measured from volume 49 to volume 88 of the second edition ofU.S.P.Q. (BNA), inclusive. 
Volume 49 contains some cases from late December 1998, while volume 88 excludes some cases from late 
December 2008. 
28 One case, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), is excluded from all of 
this Article's data; due to procedural issues, including a rehearing en bane, its inclusion would have caused data 
from the same situation to be counted twice. Also note that the data labeled as "all Federal Circuit indefmiteness 
cases" or any data not otherwise noted includes cases of all procedural types, including reversals of summary 
judgment, which operate by a different standard than, for example, reversal of the district court's judgment of 
indefiniteness. 
29 Cases that contained a claim indefmiteness issue, for the purposes of this paper, are those indexed in the U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) under 115.1109, "claim indefiniteness." The following data only account for the particular claim of the 
particular patent with defmiteness issues. Some cases were remanded for issues with other patents or other claims 
discussed in the case. While some cases contained multiple claims with definiteness issues, in the particular cases in 
this study, the court either held all claims with defmiteness issues defmite or all such claims indefmite, typically 
because the contested language appeared in all such claims. Therefore, it was unnecessary to separate data according 
to total number of claims held defmite or indefmite, although such an inquiry might produce valuable insights. 
30 This is the number of Federal Circuit cases reported under volumes 49 to 88, inclusive, of the U.S.P.Q. 
31 A valuable inquiry might ask how many Federal Circuit intellectual property cases were patent cases in order to 
determine what percentage of Federal Circuit patent cases contained a claim indefiniteness issue. 
32 Where y=mx+b, mis the slope of the trendline. A negative slope indicates a decrease and the more negative, the 
more severe the decrease. Here, the slope is -0.0225, or, in other words, each year the percentage of Federal Circuit 
indefiniteness cases that held claims defmite decreased by 2.25%. Over the ten year period of the study, that 
percentage decreased from approximately 82% to approximately 60%. The R squared value here, however, is 
0.1475, where 1.0 is a trendline that perfectly overlaps each data point. R squared values should be considered in the 
context of the study, because some contexts are more predictable than others. Litigation statistics are somewhat 
unpredictable, so an R squared value this low might still mean that the trendline is a relatively accurate 
representation of the data points given the field. To serve the most certain value, the accuracy of the trendlines used 
in this study should be considered relative to other trendlines in this study. Note that all of the graphs in this Article 
exclude data points that are non-real numbers, such as those that occur when a percentage of zero cases is 
determined; this adjustment allows trendlines to be plotted and does not decrease the accuracy of the data. 
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Table 1 
Federal Circuit Cases in U.S.P.Q. (BNA) on Subject of Claim Indefiniteness 
(Index Number 115.1109) 
Year 
Indefiniteness 
Cases33 Held Definite % Definite 
Held 
Indefinite % Indefinite 
2008 8 4 50.00% 4 50.00% 
2007 5 4 80.00% 1 20.00% 
2006 4 3 75.00% 1 25.00% 
2005 8 5 62.50% 3 37.50% 
2004 5 4 80.00% 1 20.00% 
2003 8 5 62.50% 3 37.50% 
2002 4 2 50.00% 2 50.00% 
2001 4 3 75.00% 1 25.00% 
2000 2 2 100.00% 0 0.00% 
1999 0 0 NIA 0 NIA 
Total: 48 32 66.67% 16 33.33% 
Figure 1 
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These forty-eight cases, however, include a variety of procedural scenarios; only thirty­
three were final decisions on the issue of claim indefiniteness.34 For example, some cases 
33 "Indefiniteness cases" in tables and charts means those cases that are indexed in 115.1109 of the U.S.P.Q. (BNA). 
34 For purposes of this Article, "final" means that the Federal Circuit performed one of the following actions with 
regard to the claim indefiniteness issue: affirmed a judgment of indefiniteness, affirmed a judgment of definiteness, 
reversed a judgment of indefiniteness, affirmed a judgment of indefiniteness, affirmed a summary judgment of 
indefiniteness, or affirmed a summary judgment of definiteness. "Final" does not include cases where, with regard to 
the claim indefiniteness issue, the Federal Circuit later reheard en bane, reversed or vacated summary judgment of 
indefiniteness, reversed or vacated summary judgment of defmiteness, affirmed a preliminary injunction, or vacated 
and remanded a judgment of definiteness or indefiniteness. 
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reversed a lower court's grant of summary judgment and therefore might reach a different 
conclusion once all of the facts are determined. Another case merely affirmed a preliminary 
injunction. 
In these thirty-three final cases, the Federal Circuit found claims definite in eighteen 
cases but indefinite in fifteen cases. In other words, 54.55% of all final Federal Circuit claim 
indefiniteness cases found claims definite and 45.45% of final cases found claims indefinite. 
Table 2 shows how many and what percentages of final Federal Circuit indefiniteness 
cases were held definite and indefinite each year. Figure 2 shows the percentage of final Federal 
Circuit indefiniteness cases that held claims definite increased slightly from 1998 to 2008.35 
Table 2 
Final Federal Circuit Cases in U.S.P.Q. (BNA) on the Su
(Index Number 115.1109) 
bject of Claim Indefiniteness 
Year 
Final Federal 
Circuit 
Indefiniteness 
Cases 
Final Federal 
Circuit 
Indefiniteness 
Cases Held 
Definite 
% of Final 
Federal Circuit 
Indefiniteness 
Cases Held 
Definite 
Final Federal 
Circuit 
Indefiniteness 
Cases Held 
Indefinite 
% of Final 
Federal Circuit 
Indefiniteness 
Cases Held 
Indefinite 
2008 6 2 33.33% 4 66.67% 
2007 4 3 75.00% 1 25.00% 
2006 3 2 66.67% 1 33.33% 
2005 6 3 50.00% 3 50.00% 
2004 5 4 80.00% 1 20.00% 
2003 4 2 50.00% 2 50.00% 
2002 3 1 33.33% 2 66.67% 
2001 2 1 50.00% 1 50.00% 
2000 0 0 NIA 0 NIA 
1999 0 0 NIA 0 NIA 
Total: 33 18 54.55% 15 45.45% 
35 Here, the slope is positive 0.0133, or, in other words, the percentage of final Federal Circuit indefiniteness cases 
that held claims definite increased from approximately 46% to approximately 59% over the period of study. The R 
squared value here is 0.0341, meaning the data points varied widely from this trendline. 
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Figure 2 
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However, the percentage of non-Federal Circuit cases36 holding claims definite increased 
dramatically. As shown in Figure 3, the trendline indicates that non-Federal Circuit cases holding 
claims definite increased by approximately 60 percentage-points over the ten-year period from 
December 1998 to December 2008.37 Table 3 shows how many and what fercentages of non­
Federal Circuit indefiniteness cases were held definite, indefinite, or neither3 per year. 
36 Non-Federal Circuit cases used in this study only include those published in U.S.P.Q. (BNA). U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
does not publish all lower-court decisions, as it does with all precedential Federal Circuit decisions. Therefore, the 
significance of this data is not certain because not only does it not include all cases but it is not likely to be a 
representative sample. The Supreme Court did not hear any cases on indefmiteness during this period. Other circuits 
do not hear patent invalidity appeals. This data only includes cases from various district courts, the US Court of 
Federal Claims, and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (which hears the case before the patent is issued 
and therefore does not apply the statutory presumption of validity granted only to issued patents). 
37 Here, the slope is positive 0.0597, or, in other words, each year the percentage of all non-Federal Circuit 
indefiniteness cases that held claims defmite increased 5 .97%. Over the ten year period of study, this percentage 
increased from approximately 24% to approximately 84%. The R squared value here is 0.2822. As discussed in 
footnote 32, a perfect R squared value is 1.0. However, R squared values should be considered in the context of the 
study, because some contexts are more predictable than others. Litigation statistics are somewhat unpredictable, so 
this R squared value might still mean that the trendline is a relatively accurate representation of the data points given 
the field. This R squared value of 0.2822 means that, relative to other trendlines in the study, this trendline did not 
vary widely from the data points, and therefore should be considered reliable. 
38 "Neither" here means that the court did not make a determination on the issue of defmiteness, usually because 
some other issue in the case was more dispositive. 
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Figure 3 
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Table 3 
Non-Federal Circuit Indefiniteness Cases Published in U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
Year 
Total 
Non-F.C. 
IP Cases 
Total 
Non-F.C. 
Indefinite 
ness Cases 
Held 
Definite 
%Held 
Definite 
Held 
Indefinite 
%Held 
Indefinite 
Held Neither 
Definite Nor 
Indefinite 
%Held 
Neither 
2008 360 0 0 NIA 0 NIA 0 NIA 
2007 390 2 2 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
2006 372 2 1 50.00% 0 0.00% 1 50.00% 
2005 374 0 0 NIA 0 NIA 0 NIA 
2004 379 3 1 33.33% 2 66.67% 0 0.00% 
2003 354 2 1 50.00% 0 0.00% 1 50.00% 
2002 379 4 2 50.00% 1 25.00% 1 25.00% 
2001 386 4 1 25.00% 2 50.00% 1 25.00% 
2000 434 6 5 83.33% 0 0.00% 1 16.67% 
1999 504 3 0 0.00% 2 66.67% 1 33.33% 
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B. Chemical Cases More Often Contained Claims Held Not Indefinite; Electrical Cases 

More Often Contained Claims Held Indefinite 

The forty-eight Federal Circuit decisions on claim indefiniteness covered four subject­
areas39: biochemical, chemical, electrical, and general and mechanical. Table 4 shows how many 
and what percentages of all Federal Circuit indefiniteness cases were held definite and indefinite 
by subject area. 
Table 4 
All Federal Circuit Decisions on Indefiniteness by Subject Area from 1998-2008 
Subject Area 
Case 
Total 
Held 
Definite 
% 
Definite 
Held 
Indefinite 
% 
Indefinite 
Biochemical 1 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 
Chemical 14 10 71.43% 4 28.57% 
Electrical 16 10 62.50% 6 37.50% 
General and Mechanical 17 11 64.71% 6 35.29% 
Because non-final decisions often apply different standards than final decisions, the 
following statistics on final decisions should be considered more relevant than the statistics on 
non-final decisions. Table 5 shows how many and what percentages of final Federal Circuit 
indefiniteness cases were held definite and indefinite by subject area. Chemical claims and 
general and mechanical claims were more often held definite than indefinite, while electrical 
claims were more often held indefinite than definite. The only biochemical case held the claim 
definite. 
Figure 4 shows these comparisons graphically. Note that prior studies have also analyzed 
indefiniteness cases by subject area.40 
39 Subject-areas used in this Article are those defined by the U.S.P.Q. (BNA) for each patent. The U.S.P.Q. also 
provides sub-subject-areas, and for the cases used in this Article the subject areas included some of the following 
sub-subject-areas: for biochemical--transformable cells; for chemical--antidepressants, antibiotics, immunoassays, 
and heart surgery solution; for electrical-- defibrillator, internet processing of credit card transactions, voice 
recognition technology, and a computer network and user interface; for general and mechanical-- air mattress, feline 
surgical method, and geosteering wells. 
40 John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity ofLitigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 
185, 194, 209, 221 (1998) (From 1989 to 1996, of239 total Federal Circuit and District Court patent cases involving 
299 patents, eight, or 5.8% of invalid patents (139 total) were held invalid on claim indefiniteness grounds. Of23 
cases with claim indefiniteness issues, eight, or 34.8% held the patent invalid. Ofbiotech patents with claims 
definiteness issues, one, or 25% was held invalid. Of chemical patents with claims definiteness issues, three, or 9.4% 
were held invalid. Of computer-related patents with claims definiteness issues, two, or 22.2% were held invalid. Of 
electrical patents with claims definiteness issues, two, or 7.4% were held invalid. Of general patents with claims 
definiteness issues, three, or 3.8% were held invalid. Ofpharmaceutical patents with claims definiteness issues, zero 
were held invalid. Of software patents with claims defmiteness issues, zero were held invalid.) Note that the cited 
article uses different standards for its empirical research and thus cannot be accurately compared to the current data. 
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Table 5 
Final Federal Circuit Decisions on Indefiniteness by Sub.iect Area 
Subject Area 
Case 
Total 
Held 
Definite 
% 
Definite 
Held 
Indefinite 
% 
Indefinite 
Biochemical 1 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 
Chemical 10 6 60.00% 4 40.00% 
Electrical 10 4 40.00% 6 60.00% 
General and 
Mechanical 12 7 58.33% 5 41.67% 
Figure 4 
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The result that chemical claims and general and mechanical claims were more often held 
definite than indefinite, while electrical claims were more often held indefinite than definite, may 
be related to inherent differences in the nature of the subject matter. For example, chemical 
inventions of a particular molecular structure can be sufficiently definitely claimed by simply 
listing the proper chemical name in the claim and including the corresponding structure in the 
specification.41 Electrical inventions, on the other hand, may involve user interfaces where 
subjective terms are necessary42 or may involve longer, more complicated claims or means-plus­
function claims, which, as shown below, are more often held indefinite. Different judicial 
treatment likely also influences these results, and is addressed in Section IV. 
41 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
42 Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software Inc., 417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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C. Claims with Means-Plus-Function Issues Are More Often Held Indefinite, While Claims 
with Term Clarity Issues Are More Often Held Not Indefinite. 
This study separates claim indefiniteness issues into three categories: (1) clerical or 
semantic error; (2) means-plus-function; and (3) term clarity.43 These categories are based on 
those suggested by Chisum44 and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I L.L.C.45 The clerical 
or semantic error category will be referred to in the tables and charts as "Error;" likewise, the 
term clarity category will be referred to in tables and charts as "Terms." Term clarity is the 
broadest category and includes terms that are not easily understood, measurements that are 
unclear, and Chisum's category of "words of degree, relational terms, and ranges." 
Table 6 and Table 7 show how many and what percentages of non-final and final Federal 
Circuit indefiniteness cases were held definite or indefinite, and by what category. Of final 
Federal Circuit decisions, claims with means-plus-function issues were slightly more often held 
indefinite than not indefinite. Claims with term clarity issues were held not indefinite more than 
two-thirds of the time, the most frequent of any category. Figure 5 shows these comparisons 
graphically. 
Table 6 
All Federal Circuit Decisions on Indefiniteness by Reason 
Reason 
All F.C. 
Cases 
Held 
Definite 
% 
Definite 
Held 
Indefinite 
% 
Indefinite 
Error 6 2 33.33% 4 66.67% 
Means-plus­
function 16 9 56.25% 7 43.75% 
Terms 28 23 82.14% 5 17.86% 
Table 7 
Final Federal Circuit Decisions on Indefiniteness by Reason 
Reason 
Final 
F.C. 
Cases 
Held 
Definite 
% 
Definite 
Held 
Indefinite 
% 
Indefinite 
Error 6 2 33.33% 4 66.67% 
Means-plus-function 11 5 45.45% 6 54.55% 
Terms 16 11 68.75% 5 31.25% 
43 Some cases in the non-final decisions data fell into both means-plus-function and terms categories because 

multiple claims had indefiniteness issues for different reasons. 

44 3 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 8.03. 

45 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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Figure 5 
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III. Discussion 
A. 	 The "Insolubly Ambiguous" Standard Incorporates the Burden ofClear and Convincing 
Evidence 
Section 112 requires that claims "particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject 
matter which the applicant regards as his invention."46 However, § 282 gives issued patents a 
presumption of validity.47 Therefore, courts must consider both the requirement that claims be 
clear to be valid and the presumption ofvalidity. 
The Federal Circuit in Exxon Research and Engineering Co. v. United States set forth the 
"insolubly ambiguous" standard for indefiniteness.48 This standard incorporates the statutory 
presumption of validity.49 The likely reason that the Exxon court joined the two standards is that 
it is easier, faster, and more concise for a court to apply the "insolubly ambiguous" standard than 
it would be for the court to explicitly apply both § 112's requirement for clarity and § 282's 
presumption of validity. so However, as shown infra, problems arise when courts do not clearly 
delineate the legal standard from the presumption ofvalidity. 
46 35 U.S.C. § 112. 

47 35 u.s.c § 282. 

48 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

49 A. Meaghin Burke, Comment, New Approaches to Pharmaceutical Patent Law: Why Current Patent 

Jurisprudence is Inappropriate as Applied to the Unique Characteristics ofChemical Compounds, 75 MISS. L.J. 

1143, 1150 n.38 (2006). 
50 See generally, 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 282. 
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The Exxon court's opinion provides ample evidence that the "insolubly ambiguous" 
standard incorporates the presumption of validity. The Exxon court stated the following when 
formulating the "insolubly ambiguous" standard: "By finding claims indefinite only if reasonable 
efforts at claim construction prove futile, we accord respect to the statutory presumption of 
patent validity and we protect the inventive contribution of patentees, even when the drafting of 
their patents has been less than ideal."51 Note that the indefiniteness issue in Exxon was in the 
term clarity category.52 Because courts often apply those rules that other courts developed in 
cases with similar fact patterns, courts more often apply Exxon's "insolubly ambiguous" standard 
to cases where the indefiniteness issue is in the term clarity category. 53 
B. Means-Plus-Function Claims Are More Often Held Indefinite Because the Federal 

Circuit Does Not Apply the "Insolubly Ambiguous" Standard to Them 

One significant problem that arises when courts do not clearly differentiate the legal 
standard of claim indefiniteness from the statutory presumption of validity is that later courts do 
not seem to remain aware of the parts that make up the hybrid "insolubly ambiguous" standard. 
Sometimes, when a court does not recognize that the "insolubly ambiguous" standard already 
incorporates the presumption of validity, it applies a double burden on those seeking to 
invalidate the patent on grounds of claim indefiniteness. 54 In other words, some courts will 
incorrectly require that the party challenging the patent must overcome the presumption of 
validity by presenting clear and convincing evidence that the claim is "insolubly ambiguous."55 
If this double-burden theory is correct, courts that apply the "insolubly ambiguous" 
standard would be less likely to find claims indefinite than courts that do not apply the "insolubly 
ambiguous" standard. Not surprisingly, this is precisely the result that this empirical study 
demonstrates. As shown supra in Section III C, claims with indefiniteness issues in the means­
plus-function category are more often held indefinite than definite. On the other hand, claims 
with indefiniteness issues in the term clarity category were more often held definite than 
indefinite. 
This result is significant because the Federal Circuit applies the "insolubly ambiguous" 
standard to claims with indefiniteness issues in the term clarity category. But on the other hand, 
the court never applies the "insolubly ambiguous" standard to claims with indefiniteness issues 
51 Exxon Research and Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
52 Id 
53 In the current study, the words "insolubly," "insoluble," and other variants were found regularly in term clarity 

cases. 

54 See, e.g., Tech. Patents LLC v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 07-3012, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88534, at *78-79 (D. 

Md. Aug. 25, 2010) ("[T]here must be clear and convincing evidence that some insoluble ambiguity exists."); 

ACQIS LLC v. Appro lnt'l, Inc., No. 09-148, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77548, at *28 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010) 

("Defendants have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the terms ... are insolubly ambiguous."); 

Media Queue, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("[D]efendants have not provided 

clear and convincing evidence that the claim terms are insolubly ambiguous."); VDP Patent, LLC v. Welch Allyn 

Holdings, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 414, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("They have failed to demonstrate by clear and 

convincing evidence that the language of the claim is insolubly ambiguous, and their motion must fail."). 

55 Id 
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in the means-plus-function category. None of the cases in this study designated as mean-plus­
function cases ever mention the term "insoluble," "insolubly," or any other derivative of the 
word. Some means-plus-function cases do not even mention the presumption of validity or the 
burden of clear and convincing evidence. 56 But those cases that do mention the burden of proof 
differentiate the burden of proof from the legal standard, saying, for example, "[A] challenge to a 
claim containing a means-plus-function limitation as lacking structural support requires a 
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the specification lacks disclosure of structure 
sufficient to be understood by one skilled in the art as being adequate to perform the recited 
function. "57 
One possible explanation for why means-plus-function cases are more often held not 
indefinite is precisely because courts do not always mention the presumption of validity. 
However, particularly in means-plus-function cases, courts may not mention the presumption of 
validity or the burden of clear and convincing evidence. Rather, the patent itself may provide the 
quantum of evidence that is necessary to invalidate the patent for indefiniteness-for example, a 
means that lacks a corresponding structure. 
In mean-plus-function cases, a claim is definite only if the claimed function corresponds 
to a structure that performs the claimed function and the specification clearly associates the two, 
from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art. 58 But if the specification 
discloses no corresponding structure at all, then the claim containing the function can be held 
indefinite without additional external evidence.59 This is because for means-plus-function claims, 
a lack of a structure is all that is required to show indefiniteness, so a patent without a structure 
would, itself, provide the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of clear and 
convincing evidence (here, evidence of a lack of a structure). 60 
Nonetheless, the reason that means-plus-function cases more often hold claims indefinite 
is that in means-plus-function cases the courts do not alter the legal standard of claim 
indefiniteness to incorporate the presumption of validity. Instead, means-plus-function cases 
define the standard for indefiniteness using language similar to the standard proposed by this 
Article: if a party seeking to demonstrate invalidity can show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the claim does not meet § 112 (by "particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the 
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention")61 then courts should invalidate the 
patent for indefiniteness. 
In cases where the indefiniteness issue is in the term clarity category, however, the court 
applies the "insolubly ambiguous" standard nearly every time, particularly in the more recent 
cases. 62 And some term clarity cases apply the "insolubly ambiguous" standard and, separately, 
56 See, e.g., Aristocrat Technologies Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521F.3d1328(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
57 Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. DA-Columbia Cablevision of Westchester Inc., 336 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
58 Cardiac Pacemakers Inc. v. St. Jude Med. Inc., 296 F.3d 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
59 Id 
60 Id 
61 35 U.S.C. § 112. 

62 See e.g., Praxair Inc. v. ATMI Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds 

Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 
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the burden of clear and convincing evidence, thereby explicitly imposing a double burden on the 
party seeking to invalidate the patent.63 Even though most cases do not apply the double burden 
explicitly, the empirical evidence, while not conclusive on this issue, tends to suggest that courts 
either apply the double burden implicitly whenever they apply the "insolubly ambiguous" 
standard or at least that the "insolubly ambiguous" standard is a higher standard of indefiniteness 
than other standards of indefiniteness.64 
C. Incorporating the Burden ofClear and Convincing Evidence Is Inappropriate in Cases 
Where That Burden Does Not Apply, such as Patent and Trademark Office Proceedings, and Is 
Contrary to the Law ofEvidence 
As shown supra, the Federal Circuit modified a legal standard of indefiniteness by 
incorporating the presumption of validity of issued patents. This is problematic for two reasons: 
(1) evidentiary burdens should not apply to the law, but rather courts should use them to 
determine what quantum of factual evidence is necessary to prove facts to which the court can 
then apply the appropriate legal standard; and (2) when the Federal Circuit incorporates the 
presumption of validity into the legal standard of claim indefiniteness, the Patent and Trademark 
Office gives unissued patent applications a presumption ofvalidity. 
Claim indefiniteness under § 112 is a question of law.65 The statutory presumption of 
validity imposes an evidentiary burden of clear and convincing evidence upon the party 
challenging the issued patent.66 In other words, only the facts supporting a finding of invalidity 
should be proven with clear and convincing evidence;67 neither the burden of clear and 
convincing evidence nor the presumption of validity (embodied by the burden) ought to affect 
the application of the legal standard. An evidentiary burden is separate from a legal standard; it 
"exists only in connection with an issue of fact."68 Therefore, the Federal Circuit acts contrary to 
established laws of evidence by incorporating an evidentiary burden into a legal standard. 
86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1229-31 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 

(Fed. Cir. 2008). 

63 See e.g., Halliburton, 514 F.3d at 1249. 

64 One alternative explanation for the results is simply that term clarity issues tend not to seriously detract from the 

ability of a person of skill in the art to understand the meaning of the patent compared to means-plus-function issues 

or clerical or semantic errors. However, the language that courts use provides evidence that it is the standard oflaw, 

rather than the type of claims, that generates the disparate results. Note, for example, language such as: "'If the 

meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over 

which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on 

indefiniteness grounds."' Praxair Inc. v. ATMI Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Exxon Research 

and Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 

65 Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

66 !ovate Health Sciences, Inc. v. Bio-Engineered Supplements & Nutrition, Inc., 586 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 

2009) ("Patents enjoy a presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006), and a party seeking to invalidate a patent 

must overcome this presumption by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence.") (citing Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2001)). 

67 Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. DA-Columbia Cablevision of Westchester Inc., 336 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

68 31A C.J.S. Evidence§ 191 (2009) (citing Walling v. Cal. Conserving Co., 74 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Cal. 1945), afl'd, 

167 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1948)). 
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Furthermore, § 282 grants the statutory presumption of validity only to issued patents.69 
Because the Patent and Trademark Office considers only patents which have not yet been issued, 
the Patent and Trademark Office should not apply§ 282's presumption of validity. Nonetheless, 
the guidelines for patent examiners note that a claim is indefinite only if it is "insolubly 
ambiguous."70 The Patent and Trademark Office therefore gives patent applications a 
presumption of validity whenever it applies the "insolubly ambiguous" standard because, as 
shown supra, the "insolubly ambiguous" standard incorporates§ 282's presumption of validity. 
In other words, by using the "insolubly ambiguous" standard, the Patent and Trademark Office is 
granting patents even when the claims are less clear than what§ 112 requires, namely that claims 
"particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as 
his invention."71 Even assuming, arguendo, that the "insolubly ambiguous" standard yields the 
correct result when the evidentiary burden is one of clear and convincing evidence, when an 
evidentiary burden other than "clear and convincing evidence" is required, as in Patent and 
Trademark Office proceedings, the "insolubly ambiguous" standard differs from the statutorily 
mandated standard under§ 112. 
D. 	 The Patent and Trademark Office Cannot Solve the Problem Locally Because Applying a 
Different Standard than "Insolubly Ambiguous" Would Be Improper Substantive Rulemaking 
The Patent and Trademark Office should not give patent applications a presumption of 
validity.72 However, the Patent and Trademark Office may only follow the laws of courts as they 
are presented because the Patent and Trademark Office lacks the explicit grant from Congress 
that is necessary to permit it to engage in substantive rulemaking. 73 Therefore, if the courts hold 
that a patent is not invalid for indefiniteness unless it is "insolubly ambiguous," the Patent and 
Trademark Office must also hold that a patent is not invalid for indefiniteness unless it is 
"insolubly ambiguous." Thus, the Federal Circuit, by setting forth a legal standard for 
indefiniteness that incorporates the presumption of validity, essentially forces the Patent and 
Trademark Office to apply an incorrect standard to patent applications. 
E. 	 The Federal Circuit Should Abolish the "Insolubly Ambiguous" Standard or Modijj; It to 
a Lower Standard That Does Not Reflect the Burden ofClear and Convincing Evidence 
There are three possible solutions. First, the Patent and Trademark Office could recognize 
that the insolubly ambiguous standard was set forth only in light of the burden of clear and 
convincing evidence, ignore it, and choose to apply only legal standards that do not incorporate 
an evidentiary burden. This, however, might be seen as substantive rulemaking. Second, 
Congress or the Supreme Court could step in to abolish or modify the "insolubly ambiguous" 
69 35 u.s.c § 282. 

70 M.P.E.P. § 2173.02. 

71 35 U.S.C. § 112 ~ 2. 

72 See 35 U.S.C. § 282. 

73 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[T]he broadest of the PATENT AND 

TRADEMARK OFFICE's rulemaking powers-35 U.S.C. § 6(a)-authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate 

regulations directed only to 'the conduct of proceedings in the [PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE]'; it does 

NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules") (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 

932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
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standard. This result is unlikely, particularly because the Supreme Court has not heard an 
indefiniteness case for over half a century.74 
Instead, the Federal Circuit should abolish or modify the insolubly ambiguous standard. 
The Federal Circuit should do this by simply no longer incorporating the presumption of validity 
and thus the burden of clear and convincing evidence into the legal standard of indefiniteness. 
There are situations when the standard of proof should differ despite the need to apply the same 
law. The difference between the standards of proof before the Patent and Trademark Office and 
before the Federal Circuit is the prime example. 
While the Federal Circuit could simply clarify that the "insolubly ambiguous" standard 
should not apply in Patent and Trademark Office proceedings and that courts should not apply a 
clear and convincing evidence standard when utilizing the "insolubly ambiguous" standard, such 
a clarification would also not be ideal. Such an approach defeats the original purpose of the 
"insolubly ambiguous" standard because it is more complicated than separate applications under 
§§ 112 and 282. Furthermore, telling the Patent and Trademark Office and lower courts only 
which burden does not apply provides insufficient guidance for what burden does apply; if the 
party seeking to invalidate a patent need not provide clear and convincing evidence of its factual 
assertions concerning indefiniteness, what burden should apply? Therefore, the Federal Circuit 
should simply abolish the standard or modify it to not include an evidentiary burden. 
Conclusion 
This Article's empirical data show that, of final Federal Circuit decisions and of all lower 
court decisions published in U.S.P.Q. (BNA), the percentage of cases holding claims definite 
increased over the ten-year period of study. Using data from final Federal Circuit decisions, 
electrical patents, which often contain more subjective descriptions than chemical patents or 
which often use means-plus-function claims, are more often held indefinite than patents in any 
other subject area. Additionally, in final Federal Circuit decisions, means-plus-function claims 
are most often held indefinite, while claims with a term clarity issue are most often held definite. 
This different percentages of claims found indefinite between these two categories is due 
to the court's differential treatment of means-plus-function issues and term clarity issues. When 
courts confront a term clarity issue, they apply the "insolubly ambiguous" standard, which 
incorrectly incorporates the evidentiary burden of clear and convincing evidence. This 
incorporation, while it may achieve the desired result in court, has negative effects elsewhere. 
Most significantly, this hybrid standard ties the hands of the Patent and Trademark Office, 
requiring the Patent and Trademark Office to apply the incorrect burden of proof in some 
instances. This effect demonstrates why evidentiary burdens should not be used to modify 
purely legal standards. In conclusion, the Federal Circuit should abolish, modify, or clarify the 
"insolubly ambiguous" standard to ensure that the burden of clear and convincing evidence is not 
incorporated into a legal standard but that the policy behind indefiniteness is. 
74 See 3 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 8.03 (noting that the most recent Supreme Court case on directly on claim 
indefiniteness was United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228 (1942)). 
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